their electric power and light systems to serve surrounding county areas. Thus in the Ruhr some of Germany's largest cities and most-powerful municipal administrations came into confrontation with powerful local state officials. County commissioners (Landrdte), the linchpins of the Prussian bureaucracy, were instrumental in building regional public service systems and hoped also to control new electric power systems. By the 1890s heavy industrial leaders had organized a regional syndicate, the Rhenish-Westphalian Coal Syndicate, to set production quotas and market coal, and they were seeking ways to rationalize production to reduce costs. Electricity provided an opportunity to integrate productive facilities and to sell a new by-product. New large-scale organizations that were national or even international in orientation dominated heavy industry and electrical manufacturing. In the Ruhr they confronted both the old state apparatus designed for an agricultural state and newer municipal administrative organizations that threatened the power of the state at the local level.1 Divergent social, political, and economic goals brought the leaders of the different institutions into conflict, and electrical technology became a powerful instrument in negotiating relations among cities, counties, heavy industrial firms, and to a lesser extent electrical manufacturers. While municipal governments could tie surrounding county areas to themselves through new public service technologies, county governments often fought to maintain their independence from municipal control. Conflict between city and county had an important impact on electrification. County officials hoped to ward off municipal control by creating regional systems, and they had some success, particularly in building systems for fresh water supply and waste water disposal. County governments controlled the use of streets and were crucial in deploying new electric technology. Landrate hoped electricity would promote rural economic development.
After 1900 several heavy industrialists added to the confusion by promoting economic concentration in the form of vertically integrated coal, iron, and steel companies. They also threatened to take over several public service technologies and hence to dominate economic and technology policy in the Ruhr. The state opposed them. Conflict was rife. As a result, those who built technological systems also constructed new institutions designed to resolve conflict over the con- 
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AEG became an important competitor of Siemens and Halske, which had grown large on telegraphy business. The AEG had close ties to banks from its inception and was quick to develop the kind of managerial hierarchy and multidivisional structure necessary to expand into a new area of business with rapid technological change. Siemens retained its older style of personal management until 1890, when its founder retired and the company became a leader in developing new managerial structures. Siemens was then able to regain its position, although AEG continued to be its chief rival. After 1900 the two giants of German electrical manufacturing absorbed most of their smaller competitors.3
Electrical manufacturers actively sought to sell electric lighting systems to municipal governments in the 1880s and 1890s. They sometimes established subsidiaries to operate the stations, as the AEG did in Berlin. In the Ruhr, the electrical manufacturer Lahmeyer founded the Rheinisch-Westfalisches Elektrizitatswerk (RWE) in 1898 to operate the central station for the city of Essen. The creation of subsidiaries allowed the inclusion of local interests and local capital, while holding companies financed and organized central station subsidiaries. Electrical manufacturers also provided advice and information on building power systems, in order to promote the sale of equipment by helping cities to establish central stations. Municipal governments needed advice to make sense out of the vast variety of plans resulting from the inchoate nature of the technology. Choosing one electrical manufacturer solved the problem of selecting a system, particularly if the manufacturer promised a good return for its monopoly of city streets.
However, city governments had developed a distrust of private capitalists operating public service technologies, particularly in the case of gas lighting. Hence some city governments preferred to hire engineers to build a municipal power system composed of components from several different manufacturers. Dortmund followed this path.4
After 1900 electrical manufacturers continued to be important sources of information for municipal and state governments interested in building regional systems. Electrical manufacturers also became important proponents of regional and even national systems. As early as 1912, Georg Klingenberg of the AEG began suggesting that a national system was possible and desirable. He promoted his vision in a series of essays in the German electrical journal Elektrotechnische Zeitschrift before and during the war. Walther Rathenau, son of the founder of the AEG, also promoted a national system through a financial union that, he hoped, would facilitate technological development. Both thought that the state would have to play a key role in building such a system as a means of overcoming local control of the technology. Klingenberg noted in 1913 that Landrate, not mayors, had built regional systems, and as a result the state had to step in to ensure that the organization of the technology could move ahead to the next 3 For these developments in electrical manufacturing see Jurgen Kocka, "Siemens und der Aufhaltsame Aufstieg der AEG," Tradition, 1972, 17:125-142 II. MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS Industrial development in the western provinces after the 1870s brought significant changes in the distribution of population in Germany from the east to the west and from rural to urban areas. Growing cities developed housing, transportation, water, sewage, health, and lighting problems. Throughout Germany, municipal governments became much more active in dealing with urban problems and became noted for their "municipal socialism." Municipal governments began providing services and even began operating businesses such as slaughterhouses to generate income so that cities could provide other services without raising taxes. Supplying gas and water to city populations was among the earliest tasks taken up by municipal governments. During the 1850s Bochum and Duisburg established the first gas facilities in the Ruhr. In 1864 Essen opened the first waterworks, and in the 1870s other cities followed its lead. Municipal administrations became more professional and expanded in size as they increased services. After unification of Germany in 1871, several cities gained independence from county control: Essen in 1873, Duisburg in 1874, Dortmund in 1875, and Bochum in 1876. These cities no longer reported to Landrate and thus had more freedom from direct state control.6
Essen and Dortmund provide good examples of how municipal administrations and mayors became involved in solving municipal problems. In Essen heavy industrial development brought a large number of health, housing, and welfare problems. Attempts on the part of private citizens to deal with those problems proved unsuccessful in the 1860s and 1870s, and as a result the city administration became increasingly active. Erich Zweigert, mayor from 1886 to 1906, accelerated this development, so that by 1914 the municipal government touched almost all aspects of city life. He took decisive steps to solve the housing problem by outmaneuvering the Landrat of the county of Essen to double the area of the city in 1901. The increase in territory allowed the city to plan housing necessary for its rapidly growing population. Mayor Wilhelm Schmieding of Dortmund also exemplified the qualities of the new, active mayors throughout Germany. He believed that city governments should provide water, gas, electricity, transporta-5 Helga Nussbaum, "Versuche zur reichsgesetzlichen Regelung der deutschen Elektrizitatswirtschaft und zu ihrer Uberfuhrung in Reichseigentum 1909 bis 1914," Jahrbuch fur Wirtschaftsgeschichte, 1969, Pt. 2, pp. 117-203 ; Georg Klingenberg, "Richtlinien fur den Bau groler Elektrizitatswerke mit Dampfbetrieb," Elektrotechnische Zeitschrift, 1912, 33:731-735, 766-769, 796-800, 814-818, 880-882; Klingenberg, "Elektrische GroBwirtschaft unter staatlicher Mitwirkung," ibid., 1916, 37:297-298, 314-317, 328-333, 343-348; Walther Rathenau, "Denkschrift, betreffend ein Reichs-Elektrizitatsmonopol," 13 Nov. 1913, Deutsches Zentralarchiv Potsdam, Reichskanzlei, Vol. 598a, pp. 372-379v, rpt. in Nussbaum, "Versuche," pp. 192-203; and Georg Klingenberg, "Elektrizitatswerke und Uberlandzentralen," Elektrotech. Z., 1913, 34:315-317. 6 Wolfgang R. Krabbe, "Munizipalsozialismus und Interventionsstaat: Die Ausbreitung der stadtischen Leistungsverwaltung im Kaiserreich," Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht, 1979, 30:265-283 To solve local problems, municipal governments often sought to work through private companies. Before the 1850s municipal governments avoided risks on new gas technology by having private companies introduce gas lighting systems.
Municipal governments began considering municipal ownership as a means of increasing their incomes from gas, but during the 1860s most cities continued to allow private ownership of gas lighting systems and signed new long-term contracts to gain expanded and improved service. As they increased their economic activities, municipal administrations began promoting technological change in the gas lighting industry to improve services further. Private owners were less interested in upgrading their systems, however, since they were receiving steady incomes and wished to amortize investment in existing facilities. Thus during the 1880s and 1890s many cities purchased gas companies in order to improve lighting service. Previously, civil servants had not thought it appropriate to spend tax money on risky ventures, and they were wary of attempting to manage productive facilities. By the 1880s and 1890s, however, gas technology had largely proved itself, and municipal administrations needed new sources of income to help finance other services. Municipal administrations solved the management problem by creating a separate administrative structure for the gasworks. There were also a number of legal forms available, such as partnerships, companies with limited liability (Gesellschaften mit beschrdnkter Haftung), and joint stock companies (Aktien-Gesellschaften), that provided other institutional forms for managing a productive facility. These forms were more important for electrification.8
Private capitalist control of the technological system could prevent technological change. In Dortmund, for instance, the municipal government could not persuade the privately owned gas company to introduce electric lighting in the early 1890s. The gas company received judicial support for its assertion that its contract with the city gave it exclusive control of municipal streets for lighting systems, forcing the city to renegotiate its contract with the company. In exchange for a longer contract and the right to deliver gas for heating and cooking purposes, the gas company agreed to give up its exclusive use of city streets for lighting and to allow the city to begin operating its own electric lighting system.9
Essen's experience with electric traction illustrates the same problem: private companies often refused to improve their technological systems and sometimes prevented technological change. Because no one in Essen's municipal administration thought that a traction system could pay for itself, the city had developed a contract to induce private parties to build a system for the city. In the early 1890s the city renegotiated the contract to persuade the private company to build an electric rather than a steam traction system, but since the contract did not 9 For a general discussion of private gas company reactions to electricity see ibid., pp. 142-147.
For Dortmund see Todd, "Technology and Politics" (cit. n. 1), pp. 27-30, 38-39. preserve any direct role for the municipal administration in the company, the city had no leverage in dealing with the company. Soon after its completion the traction system proved inadequate. The city administration spent the later half of the 1890s trying to find a way to force the private company to improve and expand the system to serve areas of the city that might not provide as high a rate of return on capital investment as other, more densely populated areas.10 Municipal governments learned that private companies might take the initial risk of introducing new technology but might not continue to do so if they were making profits on their initial investment. Experience during the 1890s with private companies proved important after 1900, when heavy industrialists began taking over public utilities.
There was another aspect of municipal development that proved important in Landrate to create local responses to local problems. Counties had a level of self-government (Selbstverwaltung) over which Landrate presided; Landrdte thus had a dual function. They were administrators who reported to a district president and ultimately to the minister of the interior in Berlin, but they also had a certain amount of local autonomy owing to their ability to direct legislation in their counties. Landrate could function as entrepreneurs by creating organizations to provide services for their counties, and they could join together to build regional systems. Landrate also had a degree of autonomy because of their local ties. In order to bind local government to the state, the Prussian minister of the interior often chose Landrate from the area in which they were going to serve, making sure, however, to choose persons loyal to the conservative Prussian state. Thus Landrdte were tied ideologically to the agrarian-dominated, conservative state bureaucracy, but because of their local connections and local power they expressed their administrative and entrepreneurial functions differently depending on the region in which they worked and the kind of local clientele they served.13
The antiurban orientation of the conservative state preserved the position of 1890 -1918 ," Central European History, 1973 became independent of Landrate supervision. After the 1870s, however, although population density increased rapidly in the Ruhr, few cities gained independence. The position of Landrat gave the state more direct control over workers and local economic activity than it would have with a mayor in an independent city. Mayors were often too liberal as well. Prussian policies kept large numbers of people under the direct control of state officials. In 1911 Hamborn, north of Duisburg, held the distinction of being the largest Prussian "rural community" (Landgemeinde), with 100,000 inhabitants. At that time there were ninety-nine "rural communities" in Prussia with more than 10,000 inhabitants, all in industrial areas. The Rhineland and Westphalia together had fifty-one, while other areas of Prussia contained three hundred "cities" with fewer than 2,500 inhabitants. 14 Landrate in the Ruhr opposed the change from an agrarian to an industrial and urban nation and hoped to use modern technology to direct change along other paths. Karl Gerstein, Landrat in the county of Bochum from 1900 to 1919, believed that farmers were crucial for a healthy state but were losing ground. His position as Landrat gave him the means to shape industrial and urban development so as to preserve the independence of rural communities. He opposed the growth of large cities through incorporation of neighboring communities because the process destroyed local self-government and the communal, economic, and cultural life necessary for a healthy society. To oppose the expansion of large cities and preserve the autonomy of rural communities and small towns, Gerstein worked to establish regional rather than municipal public utility systems. This was a sound policy that helped overcome the parochial orientation of cities. The influx of laborers into the Ruhr's growing industrial productive sites placed significant demands on local budgets to provide necessary services. Through public service systems for gas, water, transportation, and electricity, towns and cities tried to increase their own incomes and at the same time prevent a distribution of income to surrounding communities faced with the same kinds of financial problems. Landrate could work against such parochial policies because they served a larger area, the county, than did municipal governments.'5 Landrat Gerstein was a key figure in organizing a number of regional systems to deal with the problems of urbanization and industrialization. In 1902 he organized a public water supply system, the Verbandswasserwerk GmbH, to enable financially weak communities in the counties of Bochum, Gelsenkirchen, and During the 1890s heavy industrial companies searched for ways of reducing costs. Gas engines provided one means of turning a waste product into a usable commodity. They could burn either blast-furnace gas or coking gas, although they usually used blast-furnace gas, since coking gas could be sold more profitably for lighting. In the late 1890s the Horder Verein introduced the first blastfurnace gas engine. Within ten years engines producing up to 4,000 horsepower allowed companies to utilize blast-furnace gas to power blast equipment or electric dynamos. This development in the iron and steel industry meant that large companies were not readily available as consumers of publicly generated electricity. But they could sell electricity. Coal mines also developed an electricgenerating capacity in order to utilize waste coal that could not be sold or otherwise used. They introduced turbines and exhaust turbines, using steam from other turbines, to generate electricity. Both gas engines and waste coal-fired turbines improved the energy efficiency of the Ruhr's heavy industry.19
After 1900 heavy industrial companies began building electric transmission and distribution systems in the Ruhr. A large company often had productive facilities in several different areas, and electric transmission systems allowed a company to tie facilities together to improve overall efficiency in a technologically integrated system. A company could also improve its use of its installed equipment by providing electricity to neighboring communities, since industry and local communities had different load patterns. Industry showed peak periods of consumption in the early morning and early afternoon, whereas towns had a lighting load in the early evening. Industrial systems supplying towns could therefore utilize equipment more fully, thus increasing the income from fixed capital in- The Ruhr fell mostly within the government districts of Dusseldorf in the Rhine province and Arnsberg in Westphalia, and their presidents organized the initial state reaction to the RWE. They opposed the private monopoly of a public service. The district president in Arnsberg thought such a monopoly would become a "pressing burden" on the public, and he observed that the section of heavy industry connected to the RWE exerted "great influence" on many communities in the Ruhr. That section would support the RWE's expressed concern for the common good and "cultural progress" only so long as it did not conflict with heavy industry's "financial interests." The district president in Dusseldorf believed that a private monopoly would make the Ruhr's economic development depend on the RWE. To protect local communities from "adroit business representatives," the district presidents sought to ensure adequate technical advice by coordinating responses to the RWE.25 They also gained the right to review the RWE's petitions to lay transmission and distribution lines on railroad property. This important concession prevented the RWE from circumventing a community's main bargaining chip, control of streets for supply systems. If the RWE could use railroad rights of way, it could build up a set of powerful local customers who might insist that a community sign a supply contract favorable to the RWE and not to the community.26
Despite similarities in views and tactics, negotiations in the two areas followed different paths. The district president of Dusseldorf called several meetings in fall 1905 with leading electrical manufacturers to discuss an electric supply system that would be independent of Stinnes and the RWE. Topics included a loose alliance of systems rather than one big system controlled by the RWE, and a system based on a coal mine on the left bank. Georg Klingenberg, who later promoted a national grid, argued that there were limits in size above which it was not economical to build a power system. Hence he discounted the alliance of systems and supported a system serving the left bank. The district president identified a key characteristic of any such system: it would have to match RWE 23 For the changing relationship between state and industry and the "Hibernia Affair" see Charles 
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prices in order to persuade communities to sign supply contracts, since he could not force them to sign.27 But the RWE already had a number of advantages. By 1905 it had built an extensive electric power and light system in the Rhine province and in Westphalia and could offer low prices to potential customers. Moreover, a communal government did not control it. Hence, the RWE could gain counties as customers in a way that a municipal system could not, and municipal governments, in turn, could avoid county control by joining the RWE's system. For instance, the mayor of the recently established Westphalian city of Gelsenkirchen looked to the RWE for assistance in securing his independence from Landrate. In promoting its version of a regional system, the RWE supported the mayor of Gelsenkirchen in his bid to open up surrounding county areas for future incorporation. The RWE also supported Landrate against mayors where they were the more powerful local figures, as it did the Landrat in the Rhenish county of Kempen in 1910. For this tactic to succeed, the RWE had to change its business structure to include communal interests. This change did not come, however, in time to circumvent opposition in Westphalia, and as a result the RWE was unable to include the entire Ruhr in its system.28
In the district of Arnsberg, the district president, Landrdte, and mayors worked together against the Rhenish, heavy industrialist-dominated RWE. The district president played a key role in promoting the development of electrification under the control of local state and municipal officials. He hoped to keep public service systems in public hands, and he was able to find powerful allies among the Landrate of the district. One of the most important Landrdte was Karl Gerstein in the county of Bochum. He helped organize a number of meetings to coordinate responses to the RWE's expansion. Gerstein wanted a system for the entire Rhenish-Westphalian industrial area in order to maintain local autonomy.
He sought to build a broad consensus for regional electrification among officials in Berlin, in regional and local levels of administration, and in local state agencies concerned with mining, canals, and railroads. Gerstein also requested support from the most important regional coal organization with the argument that a unified regional system would benefit the coal industry.29 A regional solution for the Ruhr in the form of a technological system controlled by Landrate failed. The communities could not finance the system. Perhaps more important, the RWE was already too strong in the Rhenish section of the Ruhr, and heavy industrialists opposed state control. Gerstein believed that the communal project required the "unlimited cooperation of industry in the entire region," because each mine shaft would soon be generating electricity. Only 27 For discussions concerning the left bank see "Besprechung, betr. Lieferung von Elektrizitat fur das rheinisch-westfalische Industriegebiet durch das Rheinisch-Westfalische Elektrizitatswerk in Essen," 30 Nov. 1905, Regierung Dusseldorf 32044, pp. 73-74, HStA Dui; other reports are contained in Regierung Dusseldorf 9892, pp. 282-287, 294-298, 313-314, ibid.; and "Besprechung uber It rapidly took steps to define a territory from which it could exclude the RWE.33 30 Karl Gerstein, "Anlage eines gemeinsame kommunalen Elektrizitatswerkes fur den rheinischwestfalischen Industriebezirk," 25 Nov. 1905, Regierung Dusseldorf 9892, pp. 245-246, HStA Di!; and Gerstein to District President of Dusseldorf, 25 Nov. 1905, ibid., pp. 242-243. 31 For evaluations of Stinnes's first offer and its rejection see Peters, "Hafenerweiterung Ruhrort," 26 Mar. 1904 , Regierung Dusseldorf Prasidialburo 1068 Dii. Also see ibid., pp. Landrat Gerstein wanted to make taking over the RWE's second power system GmbH Dortmund-Bochum-Muinster und ihre Entwicklungsgeschichte (Dortmund: Lensing, 1926), pp.
22-27.
34 On the negotiations see B 3-1977, 1978, and 1983 Zentrale," 3 Feb. 1907 , B 3-1977 one basis of agreement between the three Westphalian groups, but Rathenau and Bochum's Berlin bankers did not think the investment was necessary.36 Rathenau also ignored the interests of local officials in his negotiations with the RWE and Dortmund over territory to be served by the companies and financial arrangements to resolve differences among them. Dortmund, 14 Nov. 1906 , B 3-1977 , pp. 54-64, Stadtarchiv Dortmund. See also Coels to Walther Rathenau, 28 Nov. 1906 and Gerstein to Rathenau, 19 Dec. 1906, ibid., pp. 308-309. 37 For local reactions to Rathenau's contract with Stinnes see Landrat in Recklinghausen to Gerstein, 6 Sept. 1907, KrA 496, pp. 116-117, Stadtarchiv Bochum; and Gerstein to District President of Arnsberg, 31 Oct. 1907, ibid., pp. 108-112. 38 See Gerstein to District President of Arnsberg, 20 Dec. 1907, ibid., pp. 185-186 that tried to use the new technology to expand at the expense of other institutions. Cities were growing rapidly and offering new services to their own citizens and to neighbors, many of whom were eventually incorporated into larger cities.
County administrations were made up of people who generally shared the opposition of Prussian civil servants to urban concentration and industrial growth.
They also sought to overcome the parochial goals of municipal governments that hoped to use municipal monies to solve municipal rather than county or even regional problems. Electrical manufacturers sought the potential profits from building, supplying, and running regional systems. Contingent events influenced development. In the Ruhr, heavy industrialists used electrical technology to promote vertical integration and their power in the region. Municipal and state governments in Westphalia hoped to build their own regional system but built more local ones instead. The RWE was too powerful in the Rhineland, and opposition to it did not overcome all local differences. In the Rhineland, after initial opposition, municipal and county governments began supporting the heavy industrialists.
But not before an institutional innovation. Institutions provided the framework for discussions and fights over electrification. The resolution of the struggle required the development of new, mixed corporations that could combine competing institutions and internalize conflict so that electrification could take place.
The RWE began selling stock to cities and counties or exchanging stock for existing facilities. It also placed public representatives on its board. Westphalian interests followed the same tactic. The balance of power in mixed, public-private corporations reflected local conditions in the Ruhr and the rest of Germany. No one institution, new or old, communal or commercial, was powerful enough to force unification of the Ruhr in one technological system. Since institutional relationships were at issue in the deployment of new technology, technological change was inherently political. In building technological systems, Stinnes, Gerstein, and others had to construct new institutional relationships through new business forms.
